How regional is the CPEC long-term plan?

The first round of China-Afghanistan-Pakistan (CAP) trilateral dialogue between the foreign ministers of the three countries is due to begin today. That’s a good step towards regionalism. It would be a great one if CAP becomes CAPI – where ‘I’ represents India – or even CAPII, where the second ‘I’ represents Iran.

The fabric of regional trade and investment cooperation is torn due to the relationship between Iron Rivals (India and Pakistan). Iron Brothers need to do something about it. For the success of north-south corridor, the east-west corridor ought to be developed. That torn fabric therefore must be weaved; and CAPI or CAPII can potentially provide a good forum to weave a minimum framework of trade and investment cooperation. (See also BR Research column ‘CAPI: heping yu fazhan’, published December 15, 2017)

The CAPI forum would also be in line with one of the three visions and goals spelled out in the recently released CPEC Long Term Plan (LTP).

The LTP’s international and regional vision states: “to form a new international logistics network and industrial layout based on major transportation infrastructure; elevate the status of South Asian and Central Asian countries in labor division of global economy; promote regional economic integration through stable trade growth, international economic and technological cooperation and personnel exchange”.

This vision also reflects in one of the three goals: “By 2030, the CPEC building strive to be entirely accomplished, the endogenous mechanism for sustainable economic growth in place, the CPEC’s role in stimulating economic growth in Central Asia and South Asia brought into holistic play, and South Asia shall grow into an international economic zone with global influence”.

The LTP also sees regional complementarities as an opportunity. The plan states: “the investment and financing environment for major collaborative projects between China and Pakistan is less rigid; the market environment for their industrial cooperation is improved; and it looks more promising for the international community to participate in the CPEC building and for [neighbouring countries to share its fruits]” – parentheses are for emphasis.

Yet, despite such ideals, no where in the plan document, do the two countries spell out how to go about achieving the regional vision, goals, and opportunities. What mechanism and policies for trade and investments linkages will be pursued; what diplomatic efforts might be made; and what platforms will be used. These are some of the key questions left unanswered; even broad measures to this affect are not in the plan.

Another key missing element is how the two countries plan to deal with the geopolitical and regional risks. In flagging the possible challenges, the LTP says: “the geopolitical environment is inherently unstable in South Asia. World powers’ adjustment of their policy towards this region might add to the uncertainty. The mix of international, regional, national and extremist factors might cause disruptive activities, threatening the security of the CPEC building”.

Yet, like any good planning document should, the LTP does not spell out any kind of measure to deal with or to mitigate such risks. This column contends that CAPI (or perhaps CAPII) would be a step in that direction.

Tailpiece

Has anyone observed that the symbolism of ‘taller than mountains’, ‘deeper than ocean’, and ‘higher than stars’ has weakened since the Chinese gave Pakistan a rap over the knuckles in the last JCC. The LTP too does not mention any such lofty imagery. It states the two countries have “all-weather strategic friendship” which is “deeply rooted among people, thus helpful for people-to-people bond”. That’s a bit downgraded from ‘higher than the stars’. But it’s good that way. Because it recognises that there is no friendship between countries; it is ‘strategic’. This eventually boils down to business and politics. It’s better to rationalise cute ideas of friendship now than to be hit hard by reality later.