The two recent back-to-back violent incidents in Balochistan underscore the fact that the fight against terrorism has yet a long way to go. In the first incident in Killi Almas area outside Quetta, security forces carried out an intelligence-based operation led by Col Suhail Abid, killing Salman Badeni, the Balochistan head of the sectarian terror outfit, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), along with two would-be suicide bombers. Badeni with a Rs 2 million bounty on his head was accused of involvement in the murder of over 100 members of the Shia Hazara community as well as police personnel. During the operation, Col Suhail embraced martyrdom, and four soldiers were wounded, one of whom, Syed Sanaullah Shah, later succumbed to his injuries. In an apparent retaliatory bid the next day, five suicide bombers riding an explosives-laden vehicle tried to enter a Frontier Corps centre. All five were killed by the security forces before they could succeed in their nefarious mission.

That though shows the terrorists still have an ample supply of suicide bombers. According to ISPR, the two would-be suicide bombers were Afghan nationals. There is no word on the identity of the other five, who evidently were local people. Considering the LeJ is closely linked with the TTP terrorists who have taken refuge in Afghanistan, it would not be surprising if they too came from there. Even so, these people could not be playing havoc with innocent lives in this country without the support of their local cadres/sympathizers. It is worth noting that Balochistan has traditionally been a secular society. That changed during the recent years not only because of violent extremism spilling over from the other side of the border, but also because sectarian extremists, especially groups like LeJ, were tolerated even indulged, in this country for nearly three decades.

It has been a while since the Army started intelligence-based operations (IBOs) all over the county, and in February 2017 launched an urban counter-terrorism operation, Ruddul Fasad. However, two important essentials have remained missing. One is that there is hardly any coordination between the civilian and military intelligence agencies, which badly affects the counter-terrorism effort. Second, it has become almost a cliché to remind the government of the political consensus-based National Action Plan (NAP), under which it was to take a number of measures, including dealing firmly with sectarian terrorists. Yet sectarian organisations outlawed for involvement in terrorism remain active under new names. Religious seminaries - many of which serve as breeding grounds of sectarian terrorists and suicide bombers - were to be registered and regulated. So far, the government has done next to nothing to streamline their affairs. As vital as IBOs like the one in Killi Almas are for the success of the fight against terrorism, it is equally important to fully implement NAP.